Monday, October 10, 2005

Class Syllabus Fall 2009

Journalism 419
Investigative Reporting
Fall 2009 Room 1213 Communications
2 to 3:15 PM Tuesday and Thursday
Room 1213 Communications Building
Instructor: William Recktenwald Office: Room 1224 Comm.
Office Hours Tuesday and Thursday 11 a.m. to 2 p.m.
(If you can’t find me during office hours call my cellphone 618-559-0058)

Office telephone 453-3289 Home 1-618-264-5136
E-mail teacherofnews@aol.com (put 419 in subject line)


You can find the syllabus online at http://reporting419.blogspot.com

Objectives: During this semester we will examine Investigative Reporting from several perspectives, as well as:
• Read and discuss stories that have been published looking at both pitfalls and pinnacles of the craft.
• Examine the ways you select an investigative project and follow the process through gathering needed information to outlining and writing the story.
• Practice interview techniques.
• Become proficient in Internet searching.
• Develop a personal web page (blog) to be used with your reporting.
• Understand the Federal and State Freedom of Information laws and how to use them in reporting.
• Examine ethical considerations of investigative reporting.

Attendance: Mandatory, on time, attendance is required for every class. Any absence or tardiness may have a negative impact on your grade. Three unexcused absences will result in a failing grade, if you are late to class four times you will lose a grade point. To have an absence excused the student must contact the instructor by telephone 453-3289 or e-mail by the end of the class period. Excused absences will always be at the discretion of the instructor.

Grading: There will be a series of written quizzes, and written assignments, during the semester to assure that you read assigned material, and that you pay attention in class, your personal notes can be used during quizzes. These will count for thirty percent of your semester grade. Your personal participation in class discussion counts for twenty percent. The mid-term project (your personal web page) counts for ten percent, and the final project for forty percent.

August 25- Class overview—Discussion of the investigative mindset
August 27- Weblogs-- what are they, why use them and getting started on building your own
August 29- Internet searching and the cyber trail
Sept 1- Names phone numbers, addresses and maps
Sept 8- Experts, how to find them and how to be sure they are experts
Sept 10- Discussion on the New York Times series that won the
2004 Public Service Pulitzer Prize.
www.pulitzer.org select 2004 from the dates across the top,
select Public Service then click on the works tab.
It is a long but well written series start early to read it. Quiz on series.
Sept 15- The paper trail
Sept 17- LISTSERV’s what are they? Why use them?
Sept 22- Finding stories, from conception to publication and follow-up
Sept 24- Secondary and primary sources
Sept 29- Computer assisted reporting
Oct 1- Best of the net- Quiz
Oct 6- Reading assignment TBA
Oct 8- Blog tricks
Oct 13- Legal and ethical considerations
Oct 15- Mid-term projects due.
Printed copies of your personal blog along with a 300 word
overview. Presentations by each student
Oct 20- Discussion of final project, team assignments and first team meetings.
Oct 22- Investigating schools- Freedom of Information
Oct 27- Investigating police- Open Meetings
Oct 29- Investigating courts- Quiz
Nov 3- Looking at transportation
Nov 5- Special Guest in Class
Nov 10- Interviewing
Nov 12- Story structure
Nov 17- Story support. Photo’s graphics
Nov 19- Not-for-profits Preparing a story pitch
Dec 1- Looking at politicians
Dec 3 Political contributions
Dec 8- Final Project presentations
Dec 10- Final Project presentations


Students are responsible for noting changes to the syllabus and reading assignments announced in class.
There will be numerous changes to allow the class to
Study current Investigative Projects
All such announcements will be posted at
http:// reporting419.blogspot.com











To go to, or return to William Recktenwald's personal Blog Click Here

Saturday, October 08, 2005

DETAILS FOR FINAL PROJECT

THESE ARE THE OUTLINES FROM PRIOR SEMESTERS - STARTING IN THE FALL 2006 STUDENTS WILL MAKE INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATIONS -- DETAILS WILL BE POSTED BY MID-TERM
(I am leaving these for your information only)
Journalism 419
Final Project

The following outlines my expectations for your final project in Journalism 419.

I have divided the class into five groups and designated a team leader for each group.
While I would expect most decisions to be made by consensus, the team leader will be the ultimate arbitrator. If there are problems please consult with me as soon as you can.

Every member of the team is expected to carry out his or her assigned tasks. It will be possible for three teams members to receive As, while the other two get lower, or failing grades. I would be disappointed is this scenario comes to pass. But it is possible.

Each team will meet and come up with a project that could be completed by SIU journalism students in a period of three months; and without major expense or travel.

Locate similar projects that have been completed elsewhere, consider how they were completed.

Outline who you intend to interview. What records do you plan to examine, where are those records.

What photographic support will be needed?

What graphics might be used?

How would the story be presented?
One story? A series? In connection with a local TV station?

During the last two class sessions Dec. 6 and Dec. 8 each time will make a 20-minute presentation to the class, and answer questions from several invited guests and me. Every team member will take part in the presentation. You may use PowerPoint and Internet with your presentation of you wish.

Grading consideration will be given on the societal importance of the project, legal and ethical considerations and organization, professionalism and realism in the presentation.

You do not need to write the story or to finish the investigation but after the presentation your plan should be so clearly defined that your team members could reasonably complete it in 10 weeks, working fulltime.

Subject matter is wide open with one exception:
no stories on the former railroad tie factory in Carbondale.

Bill Recktenwald

Thursday, September 29, 2005

The Big Mac

Great example of investigative reporting for sports reporters.

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Read for Oct. 4


SECTION: ROP ZONE; News; Pg. A1

LENGTH: 2387 words

HEADLINE: "Major screw-up": Boot-camp virus runs rampant;
Illness striking 1 in 10 recruits - Military leaders scramble to revive vaccination program halted in 1996 - Seattle Times Special Report

BYLINE: Michael J. Berens, Seattle Times staff reporter

BODY:


More than three decades ago, the Pentagon created two pills to ward off a lethal virus infecting boot-camp recruits. But defense officials abandoned the program in 1996 as too expensive. Now recruits are dying, thousands are falling ill, and the military is desperately racing to bring back a vaccine it once owned.

A top Pentagon official called it "a major screw-up," hobbling U.S. efforts to rapidly deploy troops abroad.

The respiratory virus now infects up to 2,500 service members monthly — a staggering 1 in 10 recruits — in the nation's eight basic-training centers, an analysis of military health-care records shows.

Since the oral vaccinations stopped, the flulike germ, adenovirus, has been associated with the deaths of at least six recruits, four within the past year, according to military records and internal reports obtained by The Seattle Times.

In addition, hundreds of bed-ridden recruits miss critical training and have to be sent through boot camp again, at a cost of millions of dollars each year. Some are dismissed permanently with medical disabilities.

The virus is expected to kill an additional six to 10 recruits before a vaccine is again available, according to a classified Defense Department briefing this year.

The virus can strike beyond military boundaries as well.

Six children of service members in the Puget Sound area were diagnosed with the virus last winter, according to doctors at Madigan Army Medical Center near Tacoma.

Most people rebound from the infection within four days, but if untreated, it can quickly turn ferocious, with fever, sore throat and labored breathing leading to severe respiratory problems such as pneumonia and even death.

Adenovirus spreads by cough or touch, thrives in confined places such as overcrowded barracks, and targets those with weakened immune systems. Overstressed recruits, trying to get in shape and adapt to the military, turn out to be ideal incubators for the virus.

Nationally, the virus has killed more than two dozen civilian children and adults in outbreaks in medical facilities in Illinois, Louisiana, Iowa, Tennessee and New York, the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports.

Military foot-dragging and high turnover of procurement officers have caused the replacement vaccine to fall behind schedule, making pills unavailable until at least 2007, possibly 2009, military health-care records show.

Dr. Margaret Ryan, a commander at the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego and an expert on the virus, calls the vaccine lapse "indefensible."

Original vaccine manufacturer Wyeth Laboratories warned as early as 1984 that it would stop churning out pills costing $1 each unless defense officials allocated $5 million to repair a deteriorating production plant.

Wyeth executives shuttered the facility in 1996. A military health budget later gave a reason: "suppression of program to pay higher priority items."

The Pentagon's unwillingness to spend $5 million on health care is now costing taxpayers tens of millions of dollars to remedy.

In September 2001, plagued by boot-camp outbreaks, defense officials finally agreed to spend $35.4 million to develop a new vaccine through Barr Laboratories of Forest, Va.

Shortly afterward, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Winkenwerder Jr. ordered vaccine efforts accelerated, according to transcripts of a Feb. 19, 2002, meeting at North Island Naval Air Station in San Diego.

"This is one of the most disappointing facts and stories that I've learned upon coming into my position," he said. "I don't want to cast aspersions on anybody who had responsibility in the past, but to be blunt this is a major screw-up. "

Abandoning vaccine

Lulled by seeming success, some military officials questioned the need to continue the program.

Few vaccinations have proved as easy or free of adverse reactions. Recruits swallow two off-white pills, which cause a mild intestinal infection that in turn creates protective antibodies against the two most virulent strains, Type 4 and 7.

Although adenovirus thrives best in barracks, the virus can prosper anywhere. Most people experience at least one attack by age 10 and recover in a few days. The germ is fatal in rare cases, particularly to children or those with weak immune systems.

The military began using the vaccine in 1971 after adenovirus blanketed military bases during the 1950s and '60s, killing an undisclosed number of troops. The vaccine essentially vanquished the germ, military studies show.

Later, doctors ruefully noted that a newer, younger cadre of Pentagon leaders failed to understand that the latent virus was controlled — not eliminated — and that it could escape once again if vaccine restraints were loosened.

Pentagon funds "were unavailable" for Wyeth in the mid-1990s so the company "was forced to end vaccine production," said Army epidemiologist Terrence Lee of the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine at an April 2002 symposium.

Wyeth spokesman Douglas Petkus said the vaccine did not appear to have a "high priority" at the time.

As vaccine production came to a halt in 1996, vaccine stockpiles were rationed to extend partial protection for three more years, with the vaccine being dispensed only from September through March.

After Wyeth's shutdown, defense officials scouted for a new manufacturer. There were no bidders for a $14 million contract offer. In the interim, the military pushed for better hygiene, such as hand washing, records show.

Other Pentagon officials, particularly in the Air Force, questioned the need to restart a costly vaccine program, according to records at the Army Surgeon General's Office.

At Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Air Force officials, acting on their own, had quietly stopped giving recruits the pills in 1987. There had been no outbreaks and scant infections since, Air Force commanders assured the Pentagon in April 1997.

As a result, defense officials adopted a wait-and-see strategy. They waited just seven weeks.

On May 22, 1997, a feverish soldier staggered into the medical clinic at Fort Jackson, S.C., the Army's largest basic-training center. Within weeks, he was followed by 673 confirmed adenovirus diagnoses of Type 4, peaking at 70 hospitalizations weekly.

The outbreak was quickly detected — and deaths averted — because of the foresight of Dr. Gregory Gray, a supervisor at the Navy's health-research center in San Diego. He was worried about what would happen when the vaccine was halted and, working in collaboration with others, had established a system to track adenovirus at boot camps.

But the military responded sluggishly after learning of the outbreak. It took seven months to ship the vaccine from its dwindling supply to Fort Jackson as the infection raged, according to records at the Army Surgeon General's Office. The epidemic stopped once the pills were in use.

Dr. Kevin Russell, a Navy commander at the San Diego center, said, "We saw, as we feared and as we expected, adenovirus rates jump up." Russell, who works with Ryan, says his research with Marine platoons shows that only half of infected troops seek treatment, suggesting that adenovirus has penetrated the military far deeper than suspected.

Before long, adenovirus struck another boot camp, this time at the Lackland base, starting in October 1999 during its grueling, first-time "Warrior Week." Over the next eight months, with no pills available, 1,371 cadets ended up flooding the base hospital, Lackland records show.

The adenovirus had irrevocably "found a home in Lackland" after all, Air Force Col. Dana Bradshaw would later acknowledge.

Virus turns deadly

Within three months in 2000, the virus killed two recruits.

It wasn't long before adenovirus killed a recruit, the first one in 28 years. On May 19, 2000, a healthy 21-year-old man arrived at the Great Lakes Naval Recruit Training Center, just north of Chicago, where up to 15,000 white-clad recruits packed the shoreline installation daily.

The trainee developed a fever June 20 and sought medical treatment and returned to his barracks. When symptoms remained unabated, he revisited the clinic June 23 and was given an antibiotic for suspected bronchitis. On June 24 he was found unconscious in the barracks. He never regained consciousness and died July 3, according to case reports from the CDC.

Within three months, the virus killed another young recruit at Great Lakes. The 18-year-old had gone to the medical clinic three times complaining of respiratory difficulties, and had been given a decongestant and acetaminophen. On Sept. 18, he went back a fourth time, suffering from severe indigestion, severe weakness and a purplish rash on his legs, suggesting hemorrhaging. He died nine hours later, according to CDC records.

At the San Diego Navy research center, Ryan investigated the deaths. Her findings provided a chilling warning: The virus could quickly kill healthy people.

"Therefore, it is quite possible that undetected adenoviral illness contributed to many more recruit deaths — especially those deaths with ill-defined causes or no pathogen identified — after the vaccine was lost," Ryan wrote this year in the American Journal of Preventive Medicine.

After the two highly publicized Navy deaths, the Institute of Medicine, an independent advisory committee of civilian doctors in Washington, D.C., began to investigate the abandonment of the adenovirus vaccine. In a scathing report, the doctors pointed to seven adenovirus epidemics at bases that could have been prevented had the vaccine been properly funded.

Their November 2000 report said the military's procurement system proved "incapable" of securing adenovirus vaccine, and its $14 million contract offer was "clearly not sufficient." It called for "extreme urgency."

Spurred by the report and the rising infection rates, the Defense Department signed the $35.4 million contract with Barr in September 2001.

However, the vaccine will not be finished until at least 2007, with a "potential push out" date of 2009, Alan Liss, Barr's senior director of biotechnology, said. Although the new vaccine is a mirror of the old formula, he said the drugmaker still must adhere to a lengthy clinical-trial process.

The military has closely held information about four of the six deaths associated with adenovirus. The Times learned of the four deaths, each of which occurred in the past year, when it obtained an internal March 31 report by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Fort Detrick, Md.

"Within the past six months, four military recruits died from suspected adenovirus infection," the report said. "This accentuates the urgent need to quickly develop the adenovirus vaccines."

Another report by the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board in February gave scant details about three of the four deaths: the death of a Marine recruit in San Diego on Sept. 3, 2003; the death of an Army recruit at Fort Sill, Okla., on Nov. 3; and the Dec. 3 death of an Army recruit who had just returned home from Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

When contacted for this story, the military would not provide names of the recruits or information on the fourth death.

Spreading to civilians

The virus has killed children at several civilian facilities.

At Madigan Army Medical Center near Tacoma, Dr. Andrew Wiesen, chief of epidemiology and disease control, is trying to keep the potentially fatal adenovirus from spreading within his hospital and leapfrogging into the community. He tests all young patients exhibiting respiratory-disease symptoms at Madigan, which sees about 3,000 patients a day.

Wiesen, a lieutenant colonel, detects four to six cases of severe pediatric adenovirus each year, usually in children of current or former service members living in the Fort Lewis area.

By segregating infected patients and treating symptoms aggressively, doctors manage to keep the isolated cases from sparking outbreaks.

Researchers have never linked a major civilian outbreak to exposures by infected military personnel, although some military doctors fear that has been the case, according to records at the Army Surgeon General's Office.

Military and public-health professionals are deeply concerned about one of the virus' most deadly strains: Ad7d2. This strain flared up in the civilian world in June 1996, just months after the military began limiting the vaccine pills in boot camps to the winter months. The outbreak killed seven children and infected six others at a pediatric chronic-care facility in Houma, La.

In November 1998, the Ad7d2 strain killed eight children and infected 23 others in a long-term pediatric care center in Chicago.

The Chicago center was just miles away from the Great Lakes naval base that had been hit the year before with an Ad7d2 outbreak that infected 396 recruits, CDC records show.

The germ spread rapidly child to child, carried by nurses who didn't wash their hands or who had become ill themselves, a CDC investigation found.

In Iowa, four children at a pediatric chronic-care facility died from Ad7d2 in October 2000. Sixteen others were infected.

Dr. Gray, who had set up the boot-camp tracking system for the germ, now is spearheading the nation's most ambitious civilian studies of adenovirus, at the University of Iowa. He has a $2.8 million grant from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to collect adenovirus samples over three years. Doctors at Children's Hospital & Regional Medical Center in Seattle will submit a proposal to participate in the study.

Gray said he thinks the Ad7d2 strain has become prevalent nationally. The 15-city study targets high-risk populations, including young children, transplant patients and military recruits.

At Madigan, Wiesen suspects the study will confirm that adenovirus is a largely unrecognized civilian problem.

"Nobody routinely tests for adenovirus because it looks like other respiratory diseases," he said. "If you don't test, you'll never know it's a problem."

Michael J. Berens: 206-464-2288 or mberens@seattletimes.com

What is adenovirus?

Adenovirus is a common virus that attacks the respiratory system, causing labored breathing, sore throat and fever. Most people experience at least one attack by age 10 and recover in a few days. Spread by cough or touch, the germ can be fatal, particularly to children or those with weak immune systems.

GRAPHIC: photo,chart; Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times : Spc. Karl Miller scours a culture from a patient for evidence of contagious germs in a laboratory at Madigan Army Medical Center near Tacoma. (0394713964)
photo,chart; Naval Health Research Center: Military infections soar with loss of vaccine (G59OE73O)
photo,chart; MIchele Lee McMullen, Kristopher Lee / The Seattle Times: Rebirth of a military germ (G59OE735)
photo,chart; Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times : Dr. Andrew Wiesen, head of the infectious-disease department at Madigan Army Medical Center near Tacoma, hunts for predatory germs. He finds cases of adenovirus infection each year among children of service members. (0394713965)

Hospital Part 1

HEADLINE: Infection epidemic carves deadly path; Poor hygiene, overwhelmed workers contribute to thousands of deathsSERIES: TRIBUNE INVESTIGATION: UNHEALTHY HOSPITALS. First of three parts. BYLINE: By Michael J. Berens, Tribune staff reporterBODY:A hidden epidemic of life-threatening infections is contaminating America's hospitals, needlessly killing tens of thousands of patients each year.These infections often are characterized by the health-care industry as random and inevitable byproducts of lifesaving care. But a Tribune investigation found that in 2000, nearly three-quarters of the deadly infections--or about 75,000--were preventable, the result of unsanitary facilities, germ-laden instruments, unwashed hands and other lapses. The industry's stance also obscures a disturbing trend buried within government and private health-care records: Infection rates are soaring nationally, exacerbated by hospital cutbacks and carelessness by doctors and nurses.Deaths linked to hospital germs represent the fourth leading cause of mortality among Americans, behind heart disease, cancer and strokes, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. These infections kill more people each year than car accidents, fires and drowning combined. Hospital infections often are preventable by adopting simple, inexpensive measures. Strict adherence to clean-hand policies alone could prevent the deaths of up to 20,000 patients each year, according to the CDC and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services."The number of people needlessly killed by hospital infections is unbelievable, but the public doesn't know anything about it," said Dr. Barry Farr, a leading infection-control expert and president of the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America."For years, we've just been quietly bundling the bodies of patients off to the morgue while infection rates get higher and higher."Hospitals provide ideal reservoirs for germs, with temperature-controlled environments and a steady stream of germ-carrying strangers pouring through the doors each day.Germs that wouldn't be harmful to healthy people in their homes or at work can turn deadly for patients too young, too old or too weak to fight the infection.In Chicago in 1998, as fever-ridden health-care workers tended to patients and as others worked without always washing their hands, eight children died of an infection that spread from the Misericordia Home on the Southwest Side into a hospital. The flulike outbreak, which the city of Chicago never revealed to the public, was halted weeks later after three dozen sick health-care workers were ordered to stay home.In a Detroit hospital, as doctors and nurses moved about the pediatric intensive care unit without washing hands, infections killed four babies in the same row of bassinets, according to court records and interviews. But it took three months for administrators to close the nursery for cleaning.Staphylococcus germs thriving inside a West Palm Beach, Fla., hospital invaded more than 100 cardiac patients, killing 13, according to court records. The survivors underwent painful and debilitating surgery, as rotting bone was cut from their bodies.The health-care industry's penchant for secrecy and a lack of meaningful government oversight cloak the problem. Hospitals are not legally required to disclose infection rates, and most don't. Likewise, doctors are not required to tell patients about risk or exposure to hospital germs.Even a term adopted by the CDC--nosocomial infection--obscures the true source of the germs. Nosocomial, derived from Latin, means hospital-acquired. CDC records show that the term was used to shield hospitals from the "embarrassment" of germ-related deaths and injuries.To document the rising rate of infection-related deaths, the Tribune analyzed records fragmented among 75 federal and state agencies, as well as internal hospital files, patient databases and court cases around the nation. The result is the first comprehensive analysis of preventable patient deaths linked to infections within 5,810 hospitals nationally.The Tribune's analysis, which adopted methods commonly used by epidemiologists, found an estimated 103,000 deaths linked to hospital infections in 2000. The CDC, which bases its numbers on extrapolations from 315 hospitals, estimated there were 90,000 that year.The CDC links infections to patient mortality both directly and indirectly. Direct cases typically involve patients who specifically died of complications caused by an infection. Indirect cases involve infections that played a major role in a patient's death, but may not have been the primary cause.Though CDC officials now say they believe most hospital infections are preventable, the agency has not arrived at a precise number.The Tribune examined federal health inspection reports and other public documents from 2000--the latest year health-care records were available nationally--to estimate that 75,000 of the deadly hospital infections took place in conditions that were preventable. Deaths were considered preventable if patients contracted infections that were spread as the result of deficiencies documented by state, federal or health-care investigators.For every death linked to an infection, thousands of patients are successfully treated each year. And many hospitals battle infections with diligence and the latest technology.But the Tribune investigation found that breakdowns occur more frequently than patients suspect and that the consequences often are deadly.Government and hospital industry reports analyzed by the Tribune reveal that:- Serious violations of infection-control standards have been found in the vast majority of hospitals nationally. Since 1995, more than 75 percent of all hospitals have been cited for significant cleanliness and sanitation violations.In thousands of cases observed by federal or state inspectors, surgeons performed operations without washing hands or wearing masks. Investigators discovered fly-infested operating rooms where dust floated in the air during open-heart surgeries in Connecticut. A surgical assistant used his teeth to tear adhesive surgical tape that was placed across an open chest wound during a non-emergency procedure in Florida.- Hospital cleaning and janitorial staffs are overwhelmed and inadequately trained, resulting in unsanitary rooms or wards where germs have grown and multiplied for weeks, sometimes years, on bed rails, telephones, bathroom fixtures--most anywhere.Because of cost-cutting measures, U.S. hospitals have collectively pared cleaning staffs by 25 percent since 1995. During the same period, half of the nation's hospitals have been cited for failing to properly sanitize portions of their facilities, a shortcoming that can colonize new patients with lingering germs.- Hospitals are required to have professional staffs devoted to tracking and reducing infections, but rampant payroll cutbacks have gutted those efforts. These staffs have been reduced an average of 20 percent nationally in just the last three years. Many hospitals disregard the CDC's recommendation of at least one infection-control employee for every 250 beds.For three months in 2000, for example, Illinois Masonic Medical Center closed down its infection-control efforts because of lack of staffing, federal inspection records show. The 507-bed North Side hospital now has new owners and has hired three infection specialists.The Tribune analysis of patient records shows that hospital-acquired infections contributed to or were the direct cause of death for at least four men and two women, ages 72 to 83, during the three-month period at Illinois Masonic. Four patients had respiratory infections; two had an infection that led to blood poisoning and caused inflammation of internal organs. Hospital officials said they could not verify the deaths based on the available information in state records, which omitted names.Federal inspectors determined at the time that Illinois Masonic had adopted a "complete disregard" for infection-control tracking. More recent inspection reports have found no problems with Masonic's infection-control program.Since 1969, when U.S. Surgeon General William Stewart confidently told Congress that the nation could "close the book on infectious diseases," hospital infection rates have quietly pushed higher each year, registering a 36 percent increase in the last 20 years, according to CDC records.Today, about 2.1 million patients each year, or 6 percent, will contract a hospital-acquired infection among 35 million admissions annually, CDC records show.The American Hospital Association said the last decade of unprecedented cost-cutting and financial instability has impacted all areas of hospital care, including infection control.Roughly a third of all hospitals are operating at a loss and a similar percentage are teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, according to the AHA."It's had an effect on infection control and it's had an effect on our ability to recruit and retain workers. It's had an effect on our ability to invest in new and updated equipment as much as we would like to," said Rick Wade, AHA executive vice president for communications."It's also a question in front of society: How much do you want to invest in high-quality, safe medical care?"Nurses, in particular, say staffing cutbacks have made the most basic requirements of their jobs difficult to fulfill, and a major study by the Harvard School of Public Health recently linked nurse staffing levels to hospital-acquired infections.The national study of 799 hospitals found that patients were more likely to contract urinary tract infections and hospital-acquired pneumonia if nurse staffing was inadequate. The study projected that the widening nursing shortage could create even more problems, such as higher mortality rates."When you have less time to save lives, do you take the 30 seconds to wash your hands?" said registered nurse Trande Phillips, who works in San Francisco."When you're speeding up you have to cut corners. We don't always wash our hands. I'm not saying it's right, but you've got to deal with reality."Infection in an operating roomA deadly outbreak that swept through a Connecticut medical center in late 1996 reveals how washing hands or wearing clean clothes can be as critical to a patient's life as a surgeon's skill.The outbreak, which received scant media attention, is detailed in thousands of pages of hospital records normally kept from public view but opened last year by the Connecticut Supreme Court after the hospital was sued. The case, which involves four patients who contracted infections inside Bridgeport Hospital, also exposes how the bottom line influences decisions that allow germs to flourish in what are supposed to be the most sterile quarters in a hospital.Operating Room 2, where up to one in five patients in 1997 contracted infections, epitomized the hospital's problems.The air often was contaminated by dust because of faulty ventilation, hospital records show. Flies buzzed overhead during open-heart surgery. Doctors wore germ-laden clothes from home into the operating room. Many never washed their hands.Gloria Bonaffini, 71, was wheeled into Operating Room 2 in December 1996 for what doctors considered routine coronary artery bypass graft surgery.Doctors told Bonaffini that she would be back home within the week, her husband recalled. Instead, an infection burrowed into her sternum, and she remained hospitalized for more than a year."I asked a nurse what was wrong with Gloria," said her husband, Phil Bonaffini, 73, who later sued the hospital. "The nurse looked at me and very quietly said, 'She has the infection.'"I asked, 'What infection?' but the nurse ran away."On her 448th day in the hospital, Gloria Bonaffini died.Her death certificate indicated that heart problems had killed her. But medical records showed the presence of a staphylococcus germ.She contracted staphylococcus sometime during surgery, and symptoms of high fever and nausea began to flare within four days, hospital records show. The germ and resulting infections attacked most organs in her body and ultimately caused her heart to fail, records show.Staphylococcus is typically spread by touch and is commonly found on the skin and nasal passages of healthy people. Most staph infections are minor, but for a heart patient, the bacteria can have grim consequences because they infect a person who already is weakened and often invade deep inside the chest during surgery.To gain access to the heart, doctors slice the sternum bone, a process known as cracking the chest. Germs carried by contaminated hands or instruments can become embedded in the bone before the sternum is fused back together. Removing contaminated bone often stunts the spread of infectious germs. However, in many cases, the germ can never be fully eradicated, hiding in the body and potentially flaring up weeks or years later.Bridgeport Hospital had wrestled with issues of infection control and deadly germs even before Bonaffini was operated on."Bridgeport had a long history of high infection rates, but corrective action was not taken until it was too late," said attorney Peggy Haering, who represented Phil Bonaffini. "What became clear is that these infections were preventable."In 1995, hospital officials hired a respected nursing organization to survey the facility after a dozen patient infections were linked to unsanitary conditions. As a result, the Association of Perioperative Registered Nurses drafted a comprehensive report detailing a dozen deficiencies and specific improvements.However, many recommendations were ignored, court and hospital records show.The report's primary recommendation--and the most expensive to implement--called for replacing the air filtration system in Operating Room 2. Yet, the $20,000 repair price was deemed too costly at the time, hospital records show.Between October 1996 and January 1997, four other patients died "with probable hospital acquired" staph germs, according to a hospital memo obtained by the Tribune. The memo doesn't link the deaths directly to the germ, but in two of the cases, it contributed to the patient's "illness" or "demise," according to the memo.The infections at Bridgeport didn't always kill. Dozens of patients survived but with a lifetime of pain, hospital and court records show.In January 1997, during cardiac bypass surgery in Operating Room 14, Eunice Babcock, 59, became infected with staphylococcus. Doctors later removed much of Babcock's sternum, and the operation left deep, disfiguring scars on her chest. Doctors had to take her abdominal muscles and fold them over her chest cavity for protection.That procedure has impaired her ability to walk more than 20 yards without collapsing.Even as Gloria Bonaffini hovered between life and death in a coma, doctors at Bridgeport Hospital voted on April 21, 1997, against testing all patients for infection because it was not "cost effective," according to minutes of a meeting by the hospital's infection-control committee obtained by the Tribune.Instead, the hospital decided to wait until patients showed symptoms before initiating tests and treatment, the records showed.At one point, hospital officials discussed the possibility of moving each infectious patient to a private room. But the infection-control committee decided the cost of more private rooms was prohibitive, internal hospital records show.Doctors and nurses assigned by administrators to examine the problem were shocked by what they found, court and hospital records show.A hidden camera was installed outside Operating Room2, and the tapes revealed that up to half of doctors, primarily surgical residents from Yale University, did not wash their hands before entering the operating room, according to hospital records.Operating rooms should be secured and sterile during surgeries, but nurses and doctors routinely stepped inside Room2, even while open-heart surgery was under way, to make personal calls on a phone mounted on the wall.Doctors also are supposed to change from street clothes into clean scrub outfits in a changing room at the hospital, but many doctors wore the scrubs home and back into the hospital the next day--and then directly into the operating room.Officials at Bridgeport Hospital, which settled the suits related to the outbreak for an undisclosed amount, acknowledge they could have been more aggressive in fixing known problems."Nobody here intentionally spread germs, but we've learned that even the smallest breakdown in infection control can have devastating consequences," said hospital spokesman John Capiello.The non-profit, 665-bed hospital has undergone a $30 million remodeling in recent years.Improvements include updating air filtration systems in operating rooms; more patient isolation rooms; motion-sensitive sinks with timed release of water to encourage proper hand scrubbing; and waterless-soap dispensers for cleaning hands quickly.Doctors are never allowed to wear scrubs to work from home. The telephone in Operating Room 2 is off limits to anyone but the surgical staff.As a result, infection rates that once soared to 22 percent of cardiac surgery patients have been brought down to nearly zero during most months, according to the hospital. The Tribune verified the lowered infection rates with public health authorities and through independently obtained hospital records.On its Web site, Bridgeport provides a clear warning about infections, a voluntary practice seldom adopted by hospitals and almost never with an acknowledgement that many cases are preventable."Naturally, there are germs present in hospitals--treating germs is part of our mission! Therefore, it is possible to get sick from a stay in the hospital. Hospital-acquired illnesses are a major concern, especially since one-third to one-half of acquired infections may be preventable," reads the Web information.Bridgeport's battle with deadly germs belies the contention that infections are inevitable, said Dr. Zane Saul, director of infectious diseases at Bridgeport."We aren't doing anything new today," Saul said. "We're just doing what we should have been doing all along."Germ warfareIn the 1840s, a Hungarian-born physician, Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis, stood in a Vienna auditorium before his medical peers and proffered a controversial theory: Washing hands saved lives.When treated by doctors with unwashed hands, pregnant women often developed fatal infections following hospital births, but mothers rarely contracted infections if doctors thoroughly scrubbed their hands with soap and water, his groundbreaking study found.European doctors quickly embraced the soap-and-water regimen--the Semmelweis technique. Infection rates plummeted immediately.U.S. doctors debated the procedure for an additional two decades.By the end of the century, however, America developed a hospital system second to none, in part through an obsession with cleanliness. Prevention became a life-or-death necessity because almost any infection could kill.But by the 1950s, the widespread use of penicillin and other antibiotics allowed doctors to overcome once-lethal infections, and over the decades, prevention gradually became less of a priority. New generations of doctors have grown accustomed to responding to symptoms--wait until the patient is sick, prescribe a drug.Within the average U.S. hospital today, about half of doctors and nurses do not wash hands between patients, a dozen recent health-care studies show.The direct observations of federal and state inspectors in recent years underscore the carelessness that threatens patient health. In Baltimore, inspection records show, a doctor placed his stethoscope on the chest of a sweaty patient in the grip of pneumonia, then walked to another room and placed the unwashed, moist device on the chest of a patient. The patient developed pneumonia.In Loyola University Medical Center in Maywood, a resident physician dropped a surgical glove on a dirty floor, picked it up, put it on his hand and changed the bloody dressing on the open wound of a burn patient. The hospital told inspectors that it has retrained the resident and others on its staff.All hospitals are required to adopt general infection-control standards to qualify for the federal Medicaid program, but each facility is allowed to draft its own rules on everything from potency of drugs to eradicating germs.Most hospitals, for instance, leave catheters connected to patients because CDC studies show that even daily removal exacerbates infection rates. But a few hospitals still work under the misguided belief that changing needles every 24 hours avoids infections, studies show.A checkerboard of local, federal and private health-care regulations does little to force hospitals to step up infection control. Most violations are quickly resolved by a hospital's promise to provide more training, federal records show."Can you imagine the medical community outcry if even a single doctor died from germs because of a failure to wash hands?" said Mark Bruley, a forensic investigator who studies hospital conditions for ECRI, a non-profit laboratory near Philadelphia."Health-care workers aren't the ones getting hurt. Because they don't always see the outcome, they are blind to problems."There is little incentive and, often, little time for doctors and nurses to comply with even basic standards.Nurses and other health-care workers complain that it's virtually impossible to wash hands between every patient contact, which could number 150 times or more a day in a busy hospital. A recent study showed nurses would spend 2 1/2 hours each day to wash hands thoroughly with disinfectant and water. Additionally, frequent washing causes the skin to dry out and crack.Consequently, most hospitals have begun to use a waterless disinfectant that kills germs and instantly dries on hands. Nurses can squeeze the solution on their hands from wall dispensers and continue to the next patient as their hands are cleaned. Studies show the waterless system kills germs as effectively as soap and water. However, many nurses fail to adopt even this simple measure, hospital inspection reports show.The sanitary condition of a hospital also depends on the diligence of its housekeeping staff, but in many facilities those staffs are poorly trained and overburdened.Since 1995, federal inspectors have cited 31 Chicago hospitals for failure to properly sanitize rooms between patients, mirroring problems found in half of hospitals nationally."Hospitals hire people and say just go in there and clean," said Pia Davis, president of a Chicago health-care chapter for the Service Employees International Union. "They don't show them what chemicals to use or not to use. We have report after report showing that rooms are not cleaned every day."Still, in some hospitals, there is a growing awareness that germs need to be fought with more than the latest drugs--that hospital sanitation, patient monitoring and infection tracking are key to saving lives in a never-ending battle."What is needed is not more antibiotics," said Dr. Gary Noskin, chief of infection control for Northwestern Memorial Hospital, which has some of the nation's lowest infection rates.He attributes the hospital's success to rapid detection of germs and aggressive treatment of infections."These bugs are so smart," he said. "They have been here a million years before we were here and they'll be here a million years after we're gone."----------

Monday, September 26, 2005

Hospital part 2 for Oct 4

SECTION: NEWS; ZONE: C; Pg. 1

LENGTH: 1517 words

HEADLINE: Virus attacked Chicago children in outbreak kept under wraps

SERIES: TRIBUNE INVESTIGATION: UNHEALTHY HOSPITALS. First of three parts.

BYLINE: By Michael J. Berens, Tribune staff reporter

BODY:


The germ raced through the Misericordia Home for handicapped children in Chicago, masquerading as a cold-weather flu as it moved from bed to bed.

Each child already was ill; most had been born with severe physical and mental impairments. The rare strain of adenovirus pounced on their weakened immune systems, enveloping victims with blistering fevers while attacking the brain, lungs or heart.

Over several weeks starting in October 1998, 31 children contracted flulike infections and eight died as the microscopic invader snaked through the 93-bed long-term care center, which is operated by the Sisters of Mercy with the support of the Catholic Church.

The outbreak on the Southwest Side was one of several nationally linked to the rare virus. But these incidents went largely unreported in the media, and in Chicago the Department of Public Health still is not releasing public records on the outbreak--an example of how health-care facilities and public agencies are able to keep damaging information about infections under wraps.

Though the virus' origins remain a mystery, federal and city health-care investigators believe they know how it was spread: The germ hitched rides on health-care workers.

Doctors and nurses at Misericordia and Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center--one of the hospitals that later treated the children--also were infected by the germ, but they continued to work among the children. The lapse meant that every cough, sniffle and touch could result in death to another child, health-care investigators concluded.

The Chicago deaths highlight what many epidemiologists warn are escalating rates of infections inside the nation's secondary tier of health care--specialized long-term care centers like Misericordia, nursing homes and outpatient clinics.

Though the federal surveillance of germ outbreaks is centered almost exclusively on hospitals, unsanitary conditions inside the nation's growing network of specialized facilities remain largely undocumented.

"There are a lot of infections that occur outside hospitals that we know nothing about," said Dr. Donald Graham, a former infection-control investigator for the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and professor at Southern Illinois University School of Medicine.

"If we don't count our infections, we won't know about them and we won't be able to intervene."

The Chicago outbreak also reveals how the Chicago Department of Public Health undermined its trust as public guardian to protect the private interests of health-care facilities.

City officials decided not to alert the public about the lethal outbreak. Even though health department officials acknowledge investigating it, they say they can't locate a single record.

"I know how embarrassing this looks for us," health department spokesman Tim Hadac said.

Sources connected to the investigation, however, provided the Tribune with city files on the Misericordia outbreak.

City health commissioner John Wilhelm defended the secrecy. The city has a fragile, voluntary relationship with health-care facilities, and if the city warned the public about every outbreak, health-care facilities might stop sharing information, he said.

During a recent tour of Misericordia, officials said that visitors are now asked to wash their hands or stay home if they have symptoms of any illness, such as the flu.

Though it is a medical facility, the home is run differently in many ways from a hospital. Children are bused to special-education classes, for instance, and visitors are welcomed at all hours, presenting opportunities for children to be exposed to germs.

"We give these children a quality of life. This is not a lockdown facility. The parents know that infection is an everyday risk, but an acceptable one," said Betty Flynn, a registered nurse and home administrator at Misericordia.

The deadliest strain

At the time of the outbreak, Misericordia and hospital officials were unaware that they were dealing with the most deadly strain of adenovirus.

Drawing upon a biological archive of germ samples collected worldwide, CDC scientists determined that the Chicago outbreak involved a strain known as Ad7d2.

As a result, the CDC launched a national hunt for the Ad7d2 germ, first documented by medical investigators in Beijing in 1981.

As word spread in the medical community about the deadly germ, a New Orleans doctor filed a report detailing a previously undisclosed June 1996 outbreak in a Houma, La., pediatric facility for long-term care that killed seven children and infected six others, according to CDC records.

In October 1999, seven patients were killed and 26 others infected by adenovirus that swept through a New York City chronic-care facility for the mentally ill, those records show.

A year later, four children died and 16 other patients were infected after the germ invaded a pediatric long-term care facility in Des Moines.

Iowa public health epidemiologist Dr. Patricia Quinlisk said investigators could not determine how the adenovirus entered the pediatric center but said that germs were cultured from the hands of a health-care worker and that several staff members also became ill from the virus. The germ, investigators theorize, may have gained a foothold in the pediatric center after infecting a child who left the facility for special-education classes.

In all three cases, the CDC records do not name the facilities, only the cities where they are located.

CDC investigators now believe the Ad7d2 germ is more rooted in the United States than previously known.

The first Chicago children stricken four years ago at Misericordia had not been bused to outside classes, leading investigators to believe that a visitor, a health-care worker or another child carried the germ into the facility.

From Misericordia, many of the fever-ridden children were sent for treatment to Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center. A registered nurse assigned to track germs in the intensive care unit was the first to suspect a pattern.

Based on the nurse's report and laboratory findings, Dr. John Segreti, chief of the infectious disease department at Rush, said he immediately recognized that the hospital, and potentially the city, was dealing with a deadly germ.

Three days after the children were admitted to the hospital, laboratory tests confirmed the presence of adenovirus. During this time, the germ spread inside Rush, infecting a 5-month-old boy who later recovered, Segreti said.

Infected children were isolated and health-care workers were ordered to adhere to strict infection-control procedures.

"We think it was spread on the hands of a health-care worker," Segreti said.

No vaccine available

There are more than 50 strains of adenovirus, but there was no way to eradicate the germ. The nation's sole vaccine was discontinued in 1996 by pharmaceutical giant Wyeth-Ayerst. At the time, company officials said demand was too low for the $1-a-pill medicine.

Healthy people typically fend off the virus, which might cause fever or other flulike symptoms. But critically ill patients, particularly children whose immune systems are paper thin, can face life-or-death struggles.

Segreti said he immediately notified the city health department, which later requested CDC investigators.

Segreti and other health-care officials believe the hospital's quick discovery of the germ may have prevented a wider, more devastating outbreak.

But Rush administrators say they also learned an important lesson about problems inside their own hospital.

Through staff surveys and laboratory tests, Segreti discovered that 36 Rush-Presbyterian health-care workers were confirmed or suspected carriers of the infection, probably picking up germs from the Misericordia children.

At least 30 doctors, nurses and technicians had fevers and other symptoms but continued to work among young patients throughout the hospital, Segreti said.

At least 26 employees failed to follow strict infection-control procedures, such as wearing gloves or washing hands.

"It's not uncommon for people in health care to think they are not part of the problem," Segreti said.

Infected workers were sent home for up to two weeks. The staff was retrained on the importance of infection control.

At Misericordia, once the outbreak was apparent, ill children were moved together in the same rooms to limit exposure to healthy children, and family visits were temporarily restricted.

"We were certainly battening down the hatches," said Deb Ryan, director of nursing at Misericordia.

Although nobody located the source of the germ, Misericordia employees received training on hand-washing procedures and wearing gloves and masks.

Like the nurses at Rush, at least one Misericordia employee contracted adenovirus, and some employees may have continued to work while ill, Ryan said. Since the outbreak, the staff of 180 has been told to stay home if suffering any symptom of illness, but the message is tough to enforce.

"As nurses, we've always been taught to drag yourself to work," Ryan said. "It's been the culture for 30 years. If we don't show up to work, who will take care of the children?"

GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHICS 2PHOTO: Eight children from Chicago's Misericordia Home died as a virus spread through the center in 1998. The facility now urges visitors and staff to stay home if they show any sign of illness. Tribune photo by Nancy Stone.
GRAPHIC: TRIBUNE FINDINGS
Numbers are estimated
103,000
Number of deaths in 2000 caused by infections acquired in U.S. hospitals.
75,000
Number of those deaths that could have been prevented by following basic health standards.
GRAPHIC: Tracking a pathogen.
Two deadly strains of adenovirus killed 26 people during four separate outbreaks since 1996. Officials believe the virus may have entered the country through military bases.
-
Houma, La.
Outbreak: June 1996
People infected: 13
People killed: 7
-
Chicago
Outbreak: October 1998
People infected: 31
People killed: 8
-
New York City
Outbreak: October 1999
People infected: 33
People killed: 7
-
Des Moines, Iowa
Outbreak: October 2000
People infected: 20
People killed: 4
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Chicago Tribune.
- See microfilm for complete gra

Saturday, September 24, 2005

Hospital part 3 read for Oct 4

HEADLINE: Lax procedures put infants at high risk;
Simple actions by hospital workers, such as diligent hand-washing, could cut the number of fatal infections

SERIES: TRIBUNE INVESTIGATION: UNHEALTHY HOSPITALS. Second of three parts.

BYLINE: By Michael J. Berens, Tribune staff reporter

BODY:


Tamia Jones arrived two months early, weighing less than 3 pounds. For the first three days, her life was charted from precarious to uncertain to probable. By the fifth, she opened brown eyes and was weaned from feeding tube to mother's milk. On the seventh, she died.

One of the nation's most prolific and lethal germs, pseudomonas aeruginosa, was on the loose in a hospital nursery.

Tamia's parents say no one at Sinai-Grace Hospital in Detroit even mentioned the infection to them. If it was a secret, it became one that was impossible to keep.

In three months in spring 1997, on the same floor, within the same nursery unit, along the same row of bassinets, hospital germs contributed to the deaths of three other babies and slipped undetected into 15 more newborns at Sinai-Grace.

Pseudomonas is just one killer among dozens of lethal germs that have transformed pediatric intensive care units into the most dangerous area for infections in a hospital, a Tribune investigation found.

The Tribune linked the deaths of 2,610 infants in 2000 to preventable hospital-acquired infections. Examining patients of all ages, the Tribune identified 75,000 preventable deaths where hospital-acquired infections played a major role. This analysis, based on the most recent national data, is the most comprehensive of its kind and draws on thousands of hospital and government inspection reports.

Pediatric intensive care units experience up to three times the number of infections as other hospital areas, including operating rooms, according to the Tribune analysis and records at the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

And though overall infant mortality rates continue to decline inside U.S. hospitals, the rate of lethal pediatric infections acquired in hospitals is rising, state and federal health-care records show.

In the majority of cases in pediatric intensive care units, those lives might have been saved by simple acts of washing hands or isolating patients the moment infections were detected, according to inspection and investigative files at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

The records reveal hundreds of examples of unsanitary conditions and unsafe practices:

His nose dripping from a common cold, a doctor in a Los Angeles hospital in 1999 worked the bedsides of newborn patients for half an hour without stopping to wash his hands. Within a week, 12 critically ill children contracted infections from pneumonia-causing staphylococcus germs. Two newborns died. A hospital investigator traced the germ back to the doctor.

Without protection from a mask, gloves or gown, a New York nurse took the blood pressure of a child suffering from staphylococcus, a germ that attacks the respiratory system. She then immediately embarked on bedside checks in another ward of at least six other premature infants, three of whom contracted pneumonia and died in 1998.

Hospital investigators determined the nurse was the only common link among the infected children.

Inadequately trained housekeepers at Illinois Masonic Medical Center in May 2000 failed to properly sterilize rooms, beds, walls or floors at the mother-baby unit. A germ-killing disinfectant must soak on surfaces for at least 10 minutes to be effective. Housekeepers sprayed the solution and immediately wiped it off.

Coinciding with the lack of adequate cleaning, at least 10 infants contracted minor infections in the unit, a Tribune analysis found. All the infants were successfully treated. The hospital has been taken over by a new owner, Advocate Health Care, which hired three infection-control employees. No housecleaning deficiencies have since been cited at the hospital, state records show.

In analyzing the infection problems inside pediatric units, the Tribune examined computerized patient admission and billing records as well as state and federal health-care enforcement records encompassing nearly 4 million U.S. births each year.

Infants are among the most vulnerable patients, but they routinely are treated in ways deemed inappropriate for adults within the nation's 5,810 registered hospitals. Hospital investigations and CDC and Health and Human Services records show:

- Infants riddled with infections often are treated side by side with healthier babies in large intensive care units, allowing germs to spread among patients. At least 1,200 hospitals use large pediatric wards as a cost-effective way to treat the most children. But pneumonia-causing germs, for instance, can become airborne from coughing and sneezing.

Conversely, adult patients are usually segregated into different recovery rooms based on malady, and they are usually cordoned off with curtains or other barriers not typically found in pediatric wards. Adults also are more likely to be isolated in private rooms, the CDC found.

- Harried nurses rapidly shuttling between the beds of infected patients and other areas of the hospital unwittingly transported germs that are believed to have led to deadly infections in at least 500 children in 2000. Carelessness by nurses and aides also causes life-threatening injuries to thousands more each year. Adult patients with infections are more commonly treated by teams of nurses prohibited from contact with other patients.

- An estimated 200 newborns die each year because most hospitals are unwilling to pay about $5 extra per catheter to use germ-resistant, silver alloy catheters, a federal study found. Most ill babies are connected to catheters, which are hollow, flexible tubes inserted into the body to allow passage of fluids. Although the CDC and leading health-care agencies have called for nationwide adoption of the germ-fighting catheters, many hospital officials argue that the expense is not justified compared with the number of infections prevented.

Premature and low-weight newborns are the most vulnerable patients to infection. Their underdeveloped or non-existent immune systems often coincide with serious cardiac and respiratory ailments.

"The germs can sneak up at you at times," said Mary Gould, infection-control supervisor for Children's Hospital in Birmingham, Ala. "You can't be looking at all directions at the same time.... Something could be going on behind you.

"It's really frightening when you really think about it. So many different things can happen."

Outbreaks across the country

Health-care investigators often require months to unravel complicated relationships between germs and their source. But the way germs are spread, particularly inside pediatric intensive care units, reveals a frightening commonality: simple carelessness.

A three-year outbreak in a neonatal intensive care unit at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in New Hampshire was linked to health-care workers who failed to wash their hands after petting dogs at home.

At least 15 infants were infected from 1993 through 1995 with a rare fungal infection known as Malassezia pachydermatis, commonly associated with ear infections in dogs. All the infants survived.

CDC investigators found the germ on scrapings of the ears or skin of 12 of 39 dogs owned by doctors and nurses. An internal hospital study, conducted surreptitiously after the outbreak began, found only 30 percent of health-care providers washed their hands between patients as required.

In Oklahoma City, an outbreak that raged from January 1997 to March 1998 was linked to pseudomonas germs embedded underneath the long or artificial fingernails of three health-care workers. The germ killed 16 infants and infected an additional 30 newborns.

The outbreak was aggravated by overcrowding of patients in a small space and by overburdened health-care workers who had difficulty washing hands between every contact with patients, CDC investigators found.

The lack of hand-washing is responsible for most germs spread in pediatric intensive care units, said Dr. William Jarvis, chief of the CDC's hospital infections program.

Despite lessons from past outbreaks, hospital staffs often remain indifferent to hazards that can come from their own hands, said registered nurse Christine Kovner, a member of the New York State Hospital Review and Planning Council.

"I've looked at the hands and artificial nails on some nurses and just think, 'Oh my God,'" Kovner said.

Federal and state hospital inspection reports show hand-washing is not the only personal hygiene problem. In hundreds of cases in pediatric operating rooms or intensive care wards, health-care workers have been cited for not wearing masks or gloves and for wearing costume jewelry, rings, necklaces and other adornments on the job. All are potential carriers of life-threatening germs, and most hospitals require their removal.

In November 2000 at Shriners Hospital for Children in Chicago, for example, state investigators filed a citation against a radiology technician who wore a large watch into the operating room.

In an adjacent operating room, investigators cited a surgical resident who entered the room with an untied mask, and another surgical resident who washed his hands, then fanned his arms back and forth in the air instead of using a sterile towel, potentially spreading contaminated water throughout the area.

Hospital officials have since banned all jewelry from the operating room and instituted a strict policy of wearing masks and hand-washing. No further violations have been reported.

Sanitation is particularly important in pediatric intensive care units, where hospital-acquired infection rates range as high as 20 percent, compared with less than 1 percent among infants born without medical complications, according to the American Association of Critical-Care Nurses.

Infection rates in pediatric ICUs rank higher than any hospital department because nearly all patients are attached to respirators, intravenous pumps or other invasive devices that can become an entry point for germs.

Deadly germs in the nursery

Sinai-Grace Hospital towers over Detroit's northwest side. Each year the 500-bed medical center handles 3,700 births, about 10 new lives every day.

The uncommon death of Tamia Jones on March 21, 1997, gave no pause to the pace.

On the sixth day of Tamia's life, a laboratory test showed she had been infected by a pseudomonas germ. But the infection caused by the germ worked faster than the antibiotic that was dripped into her body through an intravenous line, hospital records obtained by the Tribune show. She died the next day.

It took more deaths of premature babies and nearly two months before the hospital decided to close the nursery, segregate infected patients and scrub down every piece of equipment.

Pseudomonas is a water-based germ that can flourish in sinks, ice machines, damp towels, on the leaves of potted plants, even inside hand-lotion containers. The germ is typically spread by touch and can result in lethal infections, including in the respiratory and urinary systems. Unlike some germs that live on the skin, pseudomonas quickly looks for pathways into the body, such as respirator tubes.

Infectious-disease experts said even one case of pseudomonas in a pediatric intensive care unit should prompt immediate cleaning, isolation and enhanced testing of all current and future patients in the ward.

Dr. Wasif Hafeez, chief of Sinai-Grace's infectious diseases department, who was a lead investigator on the outbreak, defended the hospital's reaction, saying the bacteria moved so quickly the children were infected before the hospital could identify an outbreak.

"I don't think you could find anything that we could have done better," Hafeez said. The hospital reacted quickly once the outbreak was identified, he said.

"I get upset when someone says we should have been able to forecast that four children were going to die," Hafeez said. "I got my degree in medicine. Not astrology or palmistry."

He characterized the deaths as the "price of modern medicine." Fragile newborns lost 15 years ago are being kept alive with sophisticated machines and stronger medicines, which make patients more prone to "unbelievably virulent" germs like pseudomonas, he said.

After parents banded together to file a lawsuit, hospital officials pointed the finger of blame at Tamia's mother, Tracey Jones, who suffered several prenatal complications the officials said could have been caused by a pseudomonas germ. When Jones was brought to the hospital for an emergency Caesarean section, she might have carried the germ into the facility, a pediatric doctor at Sinai-Grace testified in a deposition.

There was one problem with that theory. Doctors had taken swab tests of Jones' nose and mouth in search of proof that pseudomonas lived on her body after Tamia's death; the tests were negative, according to hospital records obtained by the Tribune.

Hafeez confirmed the negative test results.

What the hospital never divulged to parents is that the germ was found on an employee, internal hospital records show.

Hafeez acknowledged for the first time to the Tribune that pseudomonas was found on the hands of a respiratory therapist who had worked in the intensive care unit. The therapist, he said, was ill and had undergone a colostomy; a small tube ran from the therapist's abdomen, emptying body waste into a bag.

The moist areas of tubing or even the bag could have been breeding spots for the germ, he said.

In addition to the strain of pseudomonas found on the therapist's hands, hospital tests identified two other strains in the intensive care unit, but the source of those germs was never determined, Hafeez said.

Rebecca Walsh, an attorney who represented the families of the dead children, said the parents were never warned of the outbreak or that hospital officials had identified the germ on any of their employees.

Parents would later testify in depositions that lapses in health care were all too evident: Many nurses and doctors did not wash hands or wear gloves while moving from crib to crib.

On March 30, nine days after Tamia died, another baby girl was brought into the neonatal unit. Alexis Crooms, weighing 1 pound 12.3 ounces, showed steady improvement. She stopped breathing 19 days later. An autopsy revealed the presence of pseudomonas.

Despite laboratory evidence that Tamia had died from pseudomonas, Alexis was never specifically tested for the germ while she was alive, according to court depositions by doctors.

While Alexis was in the nursery, a premature infant boy arrived and was placed in the same row of bassinets. Within 17 days, Prateep Bazel Jr. was dead. Tests done shortly before his death revealed pseudomonas, hospital records show.

Pseudomonas can cause dozens of different infections, making diagnosis difficult. Tamia developed inflammation of the spinal cord and brain; Alexis was gripped by lung-destroying pneumonia; Prateep was overwhelmed by inflammation of his internal organs.

The fourth baby died on June 26. Once again doctors identified pseudomonas, but they were too late to save Breanna Friday, whose intestines were attacked by an uncontrollable infection.

The lawsuit filed by the parents of the four infants was settled out of court in 1999 for an undisclosed sum.

Hafeez said the hospital has since adopted stricter hand-washing policies, eliminated large hand-lotion containers at the nurse stations and banned all potted plants from patient-care areas. It immediately isolates infants with infections. There have been no further pseudomonas outbreaks, he said.

Tracey Jones, who works as a receptionist, said she believes the hospital owes the families an apology, not just money from a settlement.

Tamia's twin brother, Timothy, 5, an avid T-ball player, occasionally breaks down in tears and asks where his sister is, his parents said.

"He knows he had a twin sister," Jones said. "They say twins have a bond. We just tell him that she is in heaven, waiting."

After the death of a newborn, hospital nurses at Sinai-Grace snap a photo to provide a lasting image for parents to take home.

For her picture, a lifeless Tamia was dressed in a white pullover gown, a pink bow tied to her hair and a stuffed teddy bear nestled under her right arm.

"I've never picked up my picture," Jones said. "I just can't bring myself to do it."

She has no photos of Tamia in her Detroit home.

"I prefer my memory."

----------

The series

Sunday: Thousands of hospital patients die from avoidable infections they picked up while under care.

Monday: Following simple procedures could have helped save the lives of thousands of sick children.

Tuesday: Dangerous antibiotic-resistant germs are spreading from hospitals to the community at large.

ON THE INTERNET

Read Part One, view photos and more at chicagotribune.com/infection.

GRAPHIC: PHOTOS 4 GRAPHICS 2PHOTO (color): Tracey Jones visits a park with her son Timothy, 5, and his father, Sean Williams. Timothy's twin sister, Tamia, was one of four babies to die in 1997 as germs spread in a Detroit hospital nursery. The hospital later stiffened infection-control rules.
PHOTO (color): Within the average U.S. hospital, about half of doctors and
nurses do not wash hands between patients, a dozen recent health-care studies show.
PHOTO (color): Timothy Williams, whose twin sister died from an infection at
Sinai-Grace Hospital in Detroit, still asks where she is, says his mother, Tracey Jones. "We just tell him that she is in heaven, waiting."
PHOTO (color): Dr. Wasif Hafeez of Sinai-Grace Hospital says officials reacted
quickly once the fatal outbreak was identified. "I don't think you could find anything that we could have done better," he says. Tribune photos by Nancy Stone.
GRAPHIC: TRIBUNE FINDINGS
2,610
Number of deaths of infants in 2000 linked to preventable infections acquired in U.S. hospitals.
500
Estimated number of U.S. children whose deaths in 2000 were linked to germs spread by nurses shuttling among patients.
200
Estimated number of newborns killed each year because hospitals have not bought catheters that cost an extra $5.
Chicago Tribune.
GRAPHIC (color): Youngest patients susceptible to infections
About 6 percent of all children in pediatric intensive care units develop an infection while in the hospital, and about 1 in every 10 children with hospital-acquired infections die from them.
Source: Pediatrics medical journal, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Chicago Tribune.
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